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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the effects ofa proportional capital gains
taxin an economy with an Austrian sector (withwine and trees) and an
ordinary sector. We analyze the effect ofcapital gains taxation (on both
an accrual and a realization basis) on theefficiency with which resources
are used within the Austrian sector. Since time isthe only input which
can be varied in the Austrian sector thisamounts to looking at the effect
of capital gains taxation on theharvesting time or selling time of assets.
Accrual taxation decreases the selling time ofAustrian assets. Realiza-
tion taxation decreases the selling time ofsome Austrian assets and leaves
it unchanged for others. Inflation furtherreduces the selling time of
assets taxed on an accrual basis; often, but notalways, inflation increases
the selling time of Austrian assets taxedon a realization basis. These
results suggest that the capital gains taxcan reduce the holding period
of an asset. However, there is asense in which such taxes (at least when
levied on a realization basis)discourage transactions and increase holding
periods.It is never profitable to change theownership of an Austrian
assetbetween the timeofthe original investment and the ultimateharvesting
of the asset for final use. We examine theeffect of capital gains taxa-
tion on the efficiency of the allocation ofinvestment between sectors.
No neutrality principlesemerge when ordinary investment income is taxed
at the same rate as capital gains income.
We also analyze the effect of the special taxtreatment of capital
gains at death and find that the current U.S. taxsystem, under which
capital gains taxes are waived at death,encourages investors to hold
assets longer than they otherwise would.
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This paper examines the effects of a simple capital gains taxinan
economy with an Austrian sector and an ordinary sector. In the ordinary
sector the investment process is simple and straightforward; an investment
of a dollar produces a stream of returns in the future. Assets in the
Austrian sector do not yield a stream of services. They increase in
value as they age; when they are harvested this growth stops. The stan-
dard examples of Austrian investments are wine and trees, and we shall
use these terms to refer to two different kinds of Austrian assets. Trees
are assets which require scarce resources ——i.e.,ones which earn rents ——
whilethey age. In considering when to cut down a tree it is important
to take account of the fact that the land on which a tree now stands
can be used to grow another tree once its present occupant is felled.
Wine, in distinction, uses no scarce resources as it matures; the casks
and cellars in which wine ages earn no rents.
We focus on the effects of capital gains taxation on Austrian invest-
ments for two reasons. First, the effects are simple and straightforward.
We are able to obtain exact expressions for the effect of capital gains
taxes on the allocatjTon of investment between sectors and for the efficiency
of resource use within the Austrian sector. We extend some of this analysis
to the case where the death of the investor (which has significant tax
consequencesin the U.S.) is uncertain.1
In an earlier version of this paper, we also considered the effect of
uncertainty about the growth of Austrian assets; since the main conclusion
of that exercise was that considering uncertainty did not change the
character of our results, we have drop?ed it from our paper.Secondly, a capital gains taxaffectsthe timing of transactionS.
With Austrian assets these effects havereal, easily—understood con-
sequences. Most previousstudies, empirical andtheoretical,2 have,
implicitly or explicitly, focused onthe effect of capital gains taxa-
tion on purely financial assets.It seems clear from first principles
that capital gains taxes should, atleast in an inflationary world,
operate as a kind of turnover tax,inhibiting the sale of stocks and
bonds which show gains and encouragingthe sale of assets on which
losses have been incurred. Constantinides(1980) and Constantinides and
Scholes (1980) have shown just how appealingthe strategy of realizing
losses and never selling gains can bewhen well—organized futures
markets with low transactions costsexist. Feldstein, Sleinrod, and
Yitzhaki (1980), Feldstein and Slemrod (1978),and Feldstein and
Yitzhaki (1978) have presented evidence
that this theory is correct ——
thatthe capital gains tax does indeedinhibit the sale of assets whose
prices have increased since theywere purchased. It is not clear,at
least to us, what the real effectof such an inhibition is. In general,
sales of stock are purely financial
transactions and do not lead to invest-
ment or disinvestment of realassets. ile it seems quite likelythat
the volume of transactions has someeffect on the efficiency of the
allocation of investment, to our kno1edge,no one has framed a theory
which will allow us to deLer the preferredvolume of transactions.
Without such a theory one cannot saywhether discouraging transactions
is good or bad.
2Lippn and McCall (1980) is a significant e:ception.Our analysis assumes that capitaa gains taxes fall only on Austrian
assets. Thus we can only analyze the effect of the capital gains tax
on Austrian assets. The ordinary sector is in our model for two reasons;
first, we assume that it is sufficiently large that the after—tax rate
of return ——whichin our simple model is the social discount rate ——
isdetermined outside of the Austrian sector and is independent of the
rate and form of the capital gains tax. Secondly, having an ordinary
sector allows us to examine the effect of capital gains taxation on the
allocation of resources between Austrian and other investments.
We summarize our results as follQws. Section I sets out the basic model
and analyzes the effects of capital gains taxation on Austrian investments.
Our partial equilibrium model assumes that the total amount of investment is
fixed. Taxation, in particular the capital gains tax, can affect economic
efficiency in two quite different ways. First taxes can affect the flow of
investment between sectors. The intersectoral allocation of investment is
efficient when the present discounted value of all returns ——publicand
private ——froma dollar of investment is the same in all sectors. We find
that when income in the ordinary sector is taxed at rate and capital gains
in the Austrian sector are taxed at rate T, this equality is unlikely to
hold, even if T =T In particular, when tax rates in the sectors are equal,
0
Austrian investments have lower total returns than ordinary investments.
While not without interest, this cornparison is quite artificial. A
major accomplishment of recent research on the ta::ation of capital has
been the demonstration that T is an axtraordinarilv conplicated beast.
0
-
Asthe endproduct of the complex interaction of nan provisions of the
tax law, cannot be identified with anything so sn-1e as the corporateincome tax. ThuE it is hard to conceive of arealistic tax change
which could set T=T. 0
Anothereffect of capital gains taxation is on theallocation of
resources within a sector. For Austrian investments,the resource whose
use can be varied is time; we find thatthe capital gains tax leads to
inefficiencies within the wine sector by encouragingwine to be sold
more quickly than it would be in the absenceof taxation. This does not
hold for some tree investments. If investment opportunities are stationary,
and if there is no inflation, cutting time is independent of Tandcapital
gains taxation introduces no distortions. If conditions arenot stationary,
or if there is inflation, taxes affect cutting timein a complicated way.
These results were obtained for taxation on a realization basis.
Accrual taxation introduces different distortions. When TT total
0
returnsfrom Austrian investments (both wine and trees) can be greater
or less than returns from ordinary investments.For a given rate of
taxation, selling time (again for wine and trees)is less under accrual
taxation than under realization taxation. We have made comparisonsof taxation
at equal rates rather than equal yields because such comparisonsare simpler.
However, as Stiglitz (1981) has shown, the problem ofcalculating the effective
yield of a capital gains tax is sufficiently complexthat it seems no good case
can be made for the proposition that comparisons of taxeswhich have equal
yields are more meaningful than comparisons of taxes which have equalrates.
Our model produces no strong a priori case for the greater efficiencyof
accrual taxation. Our examination of the effects of inflationin Section II
strengthens the case for realization as opposed to accrualtaxation. Although
there are exceptions, on balance inflation (at least rapid inflation) tends to
alleviate the distortions caused by taxation on a realization basis while it5
complicates, sometimes exacerbating and sometimesalleviating the distortions
caused by accrual taxation.
In Section III we show how theanalysis is changed by
taking account of the special ways in which capital gainsare, or could be
taxed, at death. We show how the present United States taxsystem, which
allows automatic step up of basis at death,encourages' people to hold
on to assets longer than they would otherwise. Since the taxsystem leads
them to sell wine sooner than they should, at least for winethis
corrects (and possibly overcorrects) a distortion of the taxsystem.
Much previous work on capital gains taxation has focusedon the way
in which capital gains taxes tend to inhibit transactions andto encourage
investors to hold assets ——atleast assets which are growing in value ——
longerthan they otherwise would. Our analysissuggests that the effects
are diverse and complicated. The results suiamarized above showed that
the capital gains tax could sometimes shorten, sometimeslengthen, and
sometimes leave unchanged the length of time the owner of an Austrian
asset would wait before he harvested it. However, we did obtain one result
which shows that the capital gains tax discourages transactions inAustrian
assets. In Proposition 3 below we show that the owner of an Austrianasset who
is subject to capital gains taxation on a realization basis willnever
sell it to another interediate producer. Hewillalways nake higher
profits by holding on to wine until it is sold to the consicaer.Although
Proposition 3 is stated for wine, it also clearly holds for trees. Thus
the capital gains tax acts as a kind of tu:ncver or transaction taxon
Austrian assets and as such prornotes vertical integration in industries
which use ,ustrian processes.We have sacrificed a great deal of reality to keep our models simple
and tractable. The capital gains tax is proportional and everyone pays
the same rate. We ignore the complexities and arbitrage opportunities
which are encouraged by progressive taxatian at differentrates.3
We also ignore the arbitrage opportunities which the optionsmarket
permits. Constantinides (1980) andConstantinide-s and Scholes (1980)
have argued th.at by using the options imarket, investors canavoid ever
realizing capital gains. Sales of assets (which aretaxable events) are
dominatedbythe purchase and sale of options (based on theasset's
futurevalue) which can be writteninsuch a waythattaxes areavoided
ordeferred. This argent loses some of its force in anAustrian model.
Assets must be sold eventually or the tree rots orthe wine goes bad.
Row the existence of an active options marketwouldaffect our results
is an interesting question which we have notexamined.
Wehave also assumed that investors have a very simple goal.They
maximize the present discounted value of wealth.We assume a constant
discount rate of r. When we treat uncertainty we assumethat investors
are risk neutral so that they maximizethe expected present discounted
vue of wealth. Thus we ignore both risk aversionand portfolio effects.
Wemakethis choice for two reasons. First, it'swhat we can do. Second,
whileit isnot fol1y difficult to introducerisk aversion into me
3Lippman and 1cCal1 (1980) analyze a sinilar model inw'ricb t:es
areprogressive.of ourmodels,we areuncertain astohow to interprettheresults.
Supposean investor's portfolio contains assets which will be harvested
at different dates; risk aversion is not adequately treated by assuming
the same concave function values wealth receivedat each date. To handle
risk aversion a morecomplex model —presumablyone with consumption —
isneeded. A further simplification is obtained by our treatmentof death.
Weassume thatinvestorsplacethesamevalueon wealth which their heirs
realizeas onthewealth they receive if they harvestan asset.
Appendicesexplainthenotation andcontainthe details of some of
the calculations.8
I. The Basic Model
A. The Ordinary Sector
A dollar invested in the ordinary sector yields a constant stream of gross
returns y. We abstract from the entangling detail of the real world by
assuming a simple proportional tax. Thus, after tax returns are y(l —T0)
where is the tax rate in the ordinary sector. The tax rate cannot be
identified with any single parameter of the tax code such as the corporate
profits tax. Auerbach (1979) and others have analyzed the complex waysin
which the provisions of the tax la combine to produceIfthe stream of
returns is not constant, -r0 is even more complicated.
1. The After Tax Rate of Return.
We define the after tax rate of return r as the solution to
—rs
(1) 1= fy(l—T)e ds.
0
Thus,y =r/(l-T0).Since r is the rate of return available in the
ordinary sector in a competitive economy it is the rate which allinvestors
will use to discount all future benefits. In a complete model r will be
determined by the interaction between tastes (particularly time preference),
technology and endowments. In this paper we analyze the effectsof changes
in parameters, particularly tax parameters, which do not affect the ordinary
sector. Since these parameters shifts leave r unchanged, we can use rto
assay the effects of such changes on economic efficiency.2. Gross Returns and the Value of Investment.
If government revenues are usedefficiently ——orif, equiva-
lently, proceeds of taxation are returned to taxpayers —adollar of tax -
revenuecollected at time tisworth e_t. Thus the taxes collected from
an investmentprojectyielding a stream of returns y( )havea present
discounted value of I y(s) Tersds which, because of (1), is equal to
T/(l —T).Thusa dollar invested in the ordinary sector produces a
stream of returns which is worth 1 + T/(l —T)=(1— dollarswhen
both private benefits and the value of tax benefits are considered. The
fact that a dollar of investment produces more than a dollar's worth of
benefits, can lead to complications. Anything that increasessavingsand
investmentincreases welfare. If proceeds of investment are reinvested they
are worth more than if they are consumed. By positing mechanical rules for
reinvesting proceeds of investment projects, we could derive alternative
formulae forvaluing dollars of investment. Our concern in this paper is
with valuing investments in different sectors and it does notseem worth-
whiletofollow this line of analysis, at laast in part because to follow
it we would need to assume that the allocation of investment between sectors
was also fixed mechanically. Another way of aking the same point is to
say that we are assuming that the total an:nt cf investment is fixed. Given
this we examine the efficiency of the allocstfonof resourcesto investment,
bothwithin and between sectors.
B. Austrian Sectors
In the economy there are also Anstrn n.'estnent opportunities.
Austrian investments are point input1 tsfnt prs. An investmentat an initial timeto produces an asset which hasavalue of X(t —t)if
theasset is harvested and used forconsumption at time t.
1.Wine and Trees.
We consider two kinds of Austrianproduction processes. In the
first, and simpler, an initial investment producesan asset which increases
in value as it ages. We call theoutput of this process wine. The other
Austrian output, a tree, is distinguished fromwine by the fact that it
uses a scarce resource, land, as itages. When a tree is felled, another
can be planted in its place. When iine is drunk, thebottle in which it has
maturedis discarded. We need terms to describe thetime when an Austrian
asset's maturation is terminated and it isconsumed. For trees "cutting
time"seems appropriate. For wine we shall call this time"selling time."
This usage is justified in Proposition3, below where it is shown that the
capital gains tax discourages transfers of wine before it isconsumed.
Since the argument of Proposition 3 can beadapted to trees,weshall also
occasionally use selling time to refer to trees and winetogether.
2. Values and Rates of Return Without Taxes.
Suppose that there are no taxes in the Austrian sector. In equili-
brium assets invested in the Austrian sector must earn a rate of return
equal to r. If they ear-ri a rate of return greater than r, the value of
resources used to produce wine will be bid up until the rate of return isjust r. If B is the value or price ofresources used to produce wine
which hasa value of X(t) when sold or harvested aftertyears,
—rt B =maxex(t).
We will define t asthe solution tothis maximization problem.
Inequilibrium, scarce resources in the other Austriansector (trees)
also earn the competitive rate ofreturn, but since the scarce resource,
land, is not used to produce trees butto provide a place for them to
mature, the analysis is slightly different.
If trees can be planted at costF, the present discounted value of a
plot of land which can support one treeforever is, if trees are harvested
at intervals of lengthu, and if the value of a tree of age u is V(u),
(2) L(u) =—P+ (V(u) —F)e + (V(u) —P)e2'+
=—P+ (V(u)P) (e -1)-i.
The optimal cutting period u is chosento maximize L(u); if used in the
Austrian sector this plot of land hasa value of L(u). If used in the
ordinary sector it has an alternative value,say L. It is used in the
Sector in which it hasthehigher value.
C.CapitalGains Taxes, Realization.
In this section we analyze theeffects of capital gains taxes which
arelevied on a realization basis. In thenextsectionwe analyze the
effects of capital gains taxes leviedon a accrual basis.1. Wine.
Consider an investment in vine which if harvested and sold at time
t,willyield X(t). If the wine initially costs B, capital gains are
[X(t) —B).If capital gains are taxed when realized at rate Tnetproceeds
are
(x(t) —B)(l—T)+B =x(t)(l—T)+ TB.
The cutting time is chosen to maximize the present discounted value of these
net proceeds. In equilibrium investments earnthecompetitive rate of return
so that B satisfies.
(3) B =Maxe_t[X(t)(l —T)+ TB) =e_rt*[X(t*)(l_T)+ TB)
t
where the selling time t maximizes the present discounted value of the
investor's after tax profits. In interpreting (3)it shouldbe keptin mind
that r, T andX( )areparameters while B and tarechosen to satisfy (3).
If r and XC )areheld constant B and tarefunctions of T.Bis the value
of the investment opportunity represented by X( ).Ifthe realcostof the
resourcesused toproduceX( )costless than Bthen these resources will
beused to produce wine; conpetition will cause the value of these resources
to rise to B. If they coEt nore than B, the wine which has the value
stream x()willnot be produced.
The present disconte value of the total returns to an investment of
_rt*
Bdollars in wineisX(t)e .Wecan rewrite(3)to see that
(1t*)13
Let ci denote the present discounted value of the return to one dollar
invested in wine. Then
_rt*
cx(1—Te )/(l—T).
A dollar invested in the ordinary sector produces returns with a total dis-
counted value of (l—T0). The reason why these formulae differ is easy to
understand. Considered solely in terms of costs and returns on invest-
ment ineislike an ordinary investment which requires an initial
investment of B and returns X(t), tperiodslater when it is sold• If
it were taxed as an ordinary investment, the tax base would be X(t), tax
revenues would be TX(t) and the total return from a dollar's worth of invest—
—1
mentwould be (l—T).Sinceinvestments in wine are taxed as
capital gains the tax base is not X(t) but X(t) —B.We summarize this
discussion in
Proposition 1: The present discounted value of total returns from a dollar
invested in wine is less than the present discounted value of total returns
from a dollar invested in the ordinary sector if and only if
_rt* —1 (4) (l—Te)/(l—-r) <(l—)
4
There is a slight, and inessential, technical difference. In order to
use continuous time we assume that returns from ordinary investmentsare
flows while returns from Austrian investments are stocks.1L4
Ifr -T,then returns to investments in the ordinary sector are greater
than returnsto investments in wine. If i > T ,thenreturns to investments
0
in wine may or may not be greater than returns to ordinary investments.
Since different kinds of wines may have different selling times(different
t*) it is quite possible that some wine investments may have greaterand
some lesser total social returns than ordinaryinvestments. In interpreting
the condition T < it is well to keep in mind what a complicated parameter
Tis. 0
The value of B determines the allocation of resources to thewine
sector. As B increases more resources are devoted tothe production of
wine. Whether or not this increases or decreases economicwell—being
dependson (4). In contrast, the parameter t determinesthe efficiency
with which resources in the wine sector are used. The valueof all
resources devoted to wine grows according tothe function X( ).Sincethe
social discount rate is r, the wineshouldbe allowed to mature until £
where£maximizes.ertX(t).Assuming, as we shall, that x'(t)/X(t) is a
decreasing function, £isthe unique solution to
AA
(5) X'(t)/X(t) =r.
However, the selling time for wine, t*, is chosen tomaximize
private return not social return; tsatisfies not (5) but (3), thus t
must satisfy
(6) X' (t*)/X(t*) =r(l+
Thisestablishes15
Proposftion2:t<t.
Ininterpreting this proposition it should be remembered that while
each wine investment may have a differentsocially optimal selling
time £anda different privately optimal selling time t*, for all such
investments the privately optimal time is too short.Were it to increase,
the resources allocated to the wine sector would beused more efficiently
and the present discounted value of theoutput of the wine sector would
increase. Like proposition 1, proposition 2 is a consequence of the form
ofcapital gains taxation. If wine were taxed asordinary income the after
tax return would be X(t)(l—T) and t*would be chosento maximize (lT)X(t)e_'t
so t would equal 1.
A high basis increases the value of an assetsubject to capital gains
taxation. it is conceivable that this effect could bestrong enough to
encourage turnover of assets like wine. Working against this is the fact
that capital gains taxes are also turnover taxes and thusthey inhibit
transactions. We show in Proposition 3 that this latter effect dominates.
Proposition 3. No wine is sold beforeitis consumed.
Proof: Suppose first that the basis is 0. In thiscase the wine will be
consumed at the same time as it would be were there no tax. The value of
holding the wine to maturity is
=Maxe_rtX(t)(l—T) =(l—T)Max e_rtX(t) =(l—T)W°.
t t
Ifthe person sells the asset iediately for a priceShewill net, after
taxes, only (l—)S. Thus he willbebetter off selling only if S(l—T) >
(l—T)W°or ifS >W°.oever,itis syto seethatno person facing the
capital tax will pa;.' Dore than W0 to buy the asset. Aprospective
buyer is viliThz to pay only S where S is a solution to16








< e1X(t*) < Max e_rtX(t).
If the basis is B, then wT(B) > W(O) so a sale would have to realize
even more than for it to be preferable to holding the asset until
maturity. This argument considers a sale only at time t =0,but it
obviously generalizes to sales at other times. This proof depends heavily
on our assumption that all investors face the samecapitalgains tax.
Thecapital gains taxaffectsboth the allocation of wine between
sectors, through B, and the efficiency with which resourcesin the wine
sector are used, through t. The signs of these effects are determinate.
Proposition 4: Both B andtare decreasing functions of T.
Proof: 1) Let G(B, T, t) =et(X(t)(l—')+ TB) ;
(B, T) =argmaxG(B, T, t) and H(B, T) =G(B,T, i(B,T))—B.













(7)dBe <0 dT _rt* 1 —Te
2) To calculate dt*/dT we note that B isa function of Tandthat
t maximizes F(t, T)=et(X(t )(1 —T)+ TB(T)) so that t* mustsatisfy
(8) 0 =F1(t*,T)=—rF+ ertXt(t*)(l—T).
F
dt* 12
Thus, a—= —i—and,since F11 <0by the second order conditions for
11
maximizing F with respect to t,itfollows that sign dt*/dT =signF12.














= —rL <0. rt * e18
Proposition 4indicatesthat theeffects of increasing thecapital gains
taxoneconomic efficiency are complex. If inequality (4)holds——asit
will whenever I < —-thenincreasing T improves efficiency by diverting
funds from the vine sector into the ordinary sector (dB/dt < 0) the effi-
ciency ofthe resources used in the wine sector will decrease as increasing
taxes causes wine to be harvested soonerthan it should be (dt*/dT < 0).
2. Trees.
The analysis for trees is much simpler. As Lippman and McCall
(1980) have observed, the optimal cutting time u* isindependent of the
rateat which a proportional capital gains tax is levied. We model the
elfectof the capital gains tax by assuming the ownerofa tree pays a tax on
the increase in the tree's value from P, its initial cost, to V(u). Thus,
assuming he plants another tree, his after tax cash flow at time u is
(V(u) —P)(1—T)+P —P=(V(u)—P)(l—j). Thus(2) is changed to
(9) L(u) =—P+ e((V(u) —P)(l—T)+p —p)
+ e_r2u (V(u) —P)(l—T)+
=—+V(u) (1 —T)
—1
sothat u is chosen tomaximize
V(u) —P
independent ofT. e —i
itis worth noting that this doesnot hold for all tree investments;
it is a consequence of the assumption that invesent opportunities in the
treesector are stationary. If a plotof land will support a sequence oftrees eachassociated. with a planting cost P. and a potential value stream











Theoptimal sequence {u*} will be independent of T if and ——forall practical
purposes ——onlyif P1 =Pfor all i. If the sequence of planting costs is
not stationary T will affect the efficiency of resource use in the tree sector.
Proposition 6: If planting costs are constant,tlu*} ={uJ-.
Theanalysis of total return in the tree sector has elements of the
analysis in the ordinary sector and of the analysis in the wine sector. To
deal with the non—stationary case we analyze total returns from one cycle of
investment. Total investment is land withdrawn from production for u periods
and the planting cost P. Total after tax returns are (V(u) —P)(l—T) P
Thus, we have, in equilibrium.
L(l—e') +P =(V(u)-P)(l—T) er +Pe'





A dollarof investment thus brings total returns equal to
1 T—ru P -
L(l-e)+ P20
position 7. The present discounted value of totalreturns from a dollar
invested in the tree sector is 16 whereu is the cutting time of the
tree and 6 is the ratio of planting Costs to total investmentcosts.
C. Accrual Taxation
It is sometimes asserted that many of the distortions andineffi-
ciencies which the capital gainstaxcauses are due to the fact thatcapital
gains are taxed on a realization basis; if taxation were on an accrualbasis
these distortions would disappear. We examinethisclaim by analyzing the
effect of accrual taxation on the efficiency of allocation ofresources
between and within investment sectors. Our model does notsupport the
proposition thataccrualtaxation is to be preferred on efficiency grounds.
Accrual taxation introduces distortions different from, and insome cases
greater than,thedistortions caused by realization taxation. While some
parametervalues may favoraccrual taxation, one cannot makeastrong
aporicase for it ——atleast using the model of this paper. If anything
the evidence ses to run the other way. We observed above that in the
stationary case taxation on a realization basis does not affect the cutting
time of trees. We will see in Proposition 10belowthat the cutting time
oftrees is a decreasing function of the rate of accrual taxation.
1. Wine
We begin our analysisby noting that theeffect of accrual taxation
onwine istoforce investors to behave as if their discount rate were r/ (l—T)
rather than r; furtheroore, trees taxed on an accrual basis will be cut
down sooner than when taxed on a realization basis at the sane rate.Proposition 8.
If taxed on an accrual basisat rate T, wine with a growth path ofX( )
willbe harvested at time t wheretsatisfies Xt(t )/X(t )= r/(l—T).The - a a a a
presentdiscounted value of such wine isX(ta) exp—(r/l—T) ta• Furthermore
dt
<0and t< t wheretisthe harvesting time when wine istaxed on a dT a
realization basis at rate T.
Proof:
1) The key to the proof isour assumption that taxes are levied on in—
creases in the market value of the wine. Thatis, if W(t) is the value of
the wine at time t,increasesin W(t) must satisfy
(11) W(t) =e_t[W(tLt)(l_T)+ TW(t)J.
This formula assumes that the investorbought the tree for W(t) in period
tandsold it for W(t+&) in period t+Atrealizing an aftertaxreturn of
(l—T)W(t+4t) +TW(t);ifLtis sufficiently small there isno difference
between taxation on an accrual basisand taxation on a realization basis.
Using Taylor series to evaluate theright hand side of (11) and discarding
alltermsof order (t)2orgreater we see that W(t)rt =W'(t)(1—T)Tor,
Wv—r
W l-T
Thisfirst order differentialequation describes the evolution of W(t),
thevalue of the tree.A boundary condition isthatW(t)=
X(ta)if the
treeis cut dow-n at time t. Thus, thepresent discounted value of a tree
taxed on an accrual basis at rate r whichwill be cut do-n at t Is just
X(ta)e_(r/(l_T))ta. Clearlyta shauld be chosen to axIze this value.2) That dt /dt <0follows iiinediately from the fact that >o. a dT
3) Let tbethe cutting time when taxed on a realization basis with
basis B. Then
_____ =r{1 + j+i: X(t*) j
<r + J =
X'(t) = r(l+ r/(l—T)=
SinceX'(t)/X(t) is a decreasing function of t,ta <
We thus see that accrual taxation leads to a more inefficientuse of
resources within the wine sector thartaxationon a realization basis at
the same rate. We note that if T = therate which investors use to
discount returns in the wine sector is eoual to thegross or pretax rate
of return in the ordinary section. If T =T0,y =—f-—.Definethe gross
1 —T
rate of return R as the solution to
lryJ e_R5ds=
so that R=y=r/(l-T),the discount rate used by private investors
facing accrual taxation at rate T in the wine sector. This observationis
of somewhat limited interest as r, not R, is the socialrate of discount; it
is not efficient to decide when to harvest wineby using the rate R as a
discount rate.
Accrual taxation does not lead to thecorrect allocation of resources
between the wine and the ordinary sectoreven when I=T023
Proposition9
The present discounted value ofa dollar of resources invested in wine
is exp[rt T/(l—T)].
Proof:
Consider one dollar invested in winewhich goes to produce wine har-
vested at ta and worthX(ta) at that time. Gross returns are clearly
X(t)ea. Hower, inequilibrium the present discounted value of
(r/(l_T))ta after tax returns is equal to one dollar so X(ta) =e
Substituting, we find gross returns from one dollar are
exp[t(r/(l—-r) —r)]=exp[rtT/(1—T)].
Since gross returns are the sum ofprivate returns and the present
rta T/l—T
discounted value of taxes paid this latter amountmust be e —1
per dollar invested in wine.
We note that whether the total return from investmentsin wine are
greater or less than returns in the ordinary sectordepends on whether
rt (T/(l—T))> (12)(l—T)e a < 1
Because ta is a functionof T, the expression on the left hand side of (12)
isquite complicated to analyze. We give examples in Appendix Il-Awhich
show that this expreion can begreater or less than 1,thatit can be
increasing ordecreasingin I,andthat its limit as iapproaches1can
be either 0or.24
2. Trees
The effects of accrual taxationon trees are also straightforward.
The analysis of Proposition 8 applies. Atree cut down after u years of
growth yields an after—tax return with apresent discounted value of
V(u)e' T)•If planting a tree costs P, a plot of landon which trees
are planted yields returns which are equivalentto the payment of
V(u)e(T)—PUt times0, u, 2u Thus the value of land is
,. —ur/(l—r)
(13) L(u) =Vu,e —P
—ru 1— e
The optimal cutting time, U,ischosen to maximize the right hand side
of (13). It is immediatelyclearfrom (13) thatUais not, as in the
realizationcase, independent of the rate of capital gains taxation. We
du show in Proposition 10 that <0. Theoptimal cutting timeis, as
analyzed above,U.Ifthe rate of capital gains taxation is zero then U=
Thusaccrual taxation leads to trees being cut down too soon.
Proposition 10.
Theoptimal cutting time for trees which are taxed on an accrual basis




(14) uargmax - a ru u l—e25
Assumingan interior solution, the first order conditions imply
(15) P <V(u)exp(—ru 1(1—i)) — a a
r
/(1—-r))] (16)(UaT) =[V'(u)exp (_rua/(l_T)) —V(u)(1—)exp a
—ru








and, since <0by second order conditions,
a aa a a
du —ru /V'(u )u
)
ru —ru sign =sign-= sign
(e
a
—1, + 1 + (1—-re
a
Rearrangingthe first order condition (16),we find that
(
V'(u)u —ru ru —ru Pu —ru ru a
a÷1)




V(Ure V(u) '(1—i)I a
-ru+e a1
Tnus.
•_ . a a/a\ a










The right hand side of (17 )attainsa maximum overu r >0whenur 0.
-ru du a a
Atthis point (ur + 1)ea—1=0.Thus, -<0.
Whenweanalyze the gross returns to investment in trees with accrual
taxation,we get a result which is similar to Proposition 9.
Proposition 11:
If capital gains are taxed on an accrual basis at rateT,thegross
returnto one dollar invested in trees is exp (ruaT/(l_T)).
Proof: To see this, consider again aninvestmentin a single tree. Land
worthL(u )isused for a period of u and resources worthP areused to a a
—(r/(1—T)u
plant the tree. These costs bringa private return of V(Ua) e a,
Total returns from these costs are V(u) eaThus the ratio of total
returns to private returns, which is also in equilibrium the gross return
to an investment of one dollar, is exp (ruaT/(1_T)).
The discussion following Proposition 9 applies here. Whether the rate
of return to trees taxed on an accrual basis is greater orless than the
rateof return in the ordinary sector depends on the nature of the function27
v().Itis well known that as P increasesto the point whereL(Ua) =0,
Ua converges to ta; that Ua satisfies V'(Ua)/V(U) =r/(l—T).Thus,
the examples of Appendix II.Ademonstrate that(l_T)exp(rua'r/(l_T) can be
increasing or decreasing in T and that lim(lT)exp(ruaT/(1_T)) can be
T1
either 0 or .28
II. Inflation
A. The Ordinary Sector
We model inflation in the ordinary sector by assuming that a dollar
investedyieldsa stream of gross returns y(s)e. The after tax rate
of return, ',isnow the solution to
(18) 1 =fy(s)e(l—T)e'8ds.
Ifr is the after tax rateof return in theordinary sector without infla-
tion, it is straightforward to show that '= r+ r; r + r is the rate
which investors will use to discount all future benefits.
If goverrnnent revenues are used efficiently a dollar of tax revenue
collected at time s has a present discounted value equal to
Thus, the present discounted value of taxes collected is again l— As
in the case with no inflation, a dollar invested in the ordinary sector
produces a total stream of returns with present discounted value equal
to (l—T).
B. The Austrian Sectors
Our analysis of the effects of inSlaton on the Austrian sectors
focuses on the two distortions examined earlier. Table 1 summarizes the
effects of inflation on selling time and value of gross return for wine
and trees under both accrual taxation and taxation on a realization basis.
Thedetails ofthe derivation of the entries in Table1are tedious and































































































































































































































































































































































Under accrual taxation, the analysis of the effects of inflation is
straightforward, but the effects themselves defy simple summary. About all
that can be said is that inflation complicates ——sometimesexacerbating
and sometimes alleviating --thedistortions induced by taxation. If the
inflation rate is ri and the tax rate is T, wine taxed on an accrual basis
is exactly the same as wine which is untaxed but discounted at a rate
1— T
From (18) inflation can be modeled by assuming that the discount rate rises
to r+n while the nominal value of wine sold at time t equals X(t)eflt. Thus,
wine harvested at time t has a present discounted after tax value of
t I/ 1 r (r+flT)
X(t)e11exp —ir+fl)ti =X(t).exp t
L(l—T)J L(l—T)
Thesellingtime of wine, t, maximizes the expression above. This gives






The right hand side of this equation is increasing in fl.Thus, ta is
decreasing in ri.
The calculation of the present discounted value of gross returns
under inflation is similar to that of Proposition 9, only now the discount
rate r+fl is substituted for r; the gross rate of return is
exp [(r+fl) taT/(1_Tfli
which, as examples in Appendix II.B show, can be increasing or decreasing in fl.
Trees are again more complicated than wine but the effects of inflation
are cualitatively the same. The optimal cutting time Uasatisfies31




This is similar to the expression in the case without inflation, (14),
withr+flTsubstituted for —i-— 1—i 1—T
The proof thattheoptimal cutting time u is decreasing in r is
left to Appendix II.C.Since V(ua)exp[_(r+flT)/(l_T)Jua and not
V(Ua)exp[_1/(1_T)](ua)is the present discounted after tax rate of return
to investing in trees, the argument used to establish Proposition 11.
also establishes that the gross rate of return to investment in trees
is equal to exp[(r+r)uT/(l—T)]. Again, since Uaapproachesta when
L(ua) --0,the examples in Appendix II.B show that this expression can
eitherincrease or decrease as r increases.
The analysis of inflation with taxationatrealization is somewhat
less straightforward, although the results themselves fit intoa simple
pattern. Consider first wine. The present discounted value of the after
tax return from wine with basis B, sold at date t is
(20) W(t,T,rI) =e_+fl)t[X(t)euit(1_T) + TB]
=e_rtX(t)(l—T) +e_(tTB
Theownerofwine with base B will choose a harvesting time t*(i,n) which
solves
ax W(t,T,fl) t
Thefirstorder condition which t*must satisfy is
(21)(t*,T,n)=e_r)t*{_rX(t*)eflt*(l_T) —
nt* —(rr+r)TB+ X'(t*)e (1—i)) 0Let W*(T,fl) =W(t*(T,rl),T,fl). In equilibrium investments earn a competitive
rate of return so that
(22) B =B(T,rl)=W*(T,fl)=Maxe_ +n)t{x(t)ent(l_T)+TB(T,r) }.
Rearranging,we find that
"23" B"T.,=X(t*(T,r1))(l_T /'rt _Tlt*
-
[e—e
Applyingthe implicit function theorem to (21)we find that
(24)sign =sign[(r4r)t*-i+iet)t1
At low rates of inflation increases in fl can increase ordecrease selling
time, depending on the evolution of x(•).InAppendix II.D weprovide
dt
examples where isgreaterthan,lessthan, andequal to zero. As
rj=O
r approachesthe problem the owner of wine faces converges to the problem





Thus,since tk< t, for sufficiently large ri, >0,and asymptotically,
increasesin the rate of inflation correct the distortioninselling
timewhich the capital gains tax causes. Tnis asymptoticbehavior is
further il1ustrat by the gross returns on in'esentin vine. A
invesentof one dollarvine y an after ta: retr--h a
present discountedvalue of_(r+fl)t* (25) e [X(t*)eflt*(l_T)+T]
ifwineis sold at t*. The present discounted value of gross benefits
generated by this dollar is X(t*)ert. Setting (25) equal to one and
rearranging we find
(26) X(t*)e_rt* =1+ [l-.e
—l Althoughthisisless than (l—T)
,asi approaches (26) converges to
(1—T).Thus, for largeincreasesindecrease the distortionsof
the capital gains tax.
A similar argument shows that inflation increases the present dis-
counted value of gross returns to investments in trees taxed on a
realization basis. If T =T,inflationreduces the distortion which the 0
capitalgains tax induces.
Incontrast to the case of accrual taxation, theseresults fit into a
simple pattern. Inflation, at least inflationat a rapid rate, reduces the
distortions which a tax on realizedcapital gains induces. There is a
straightfoard explanation. The distortions whichthis tax induces stem
from the exclusion of the base value ofthe asset from the tax base.
Inflation reduces the value and the effect ofthis exclusion.
One entry in Table 1 does not fit thisneat pattern. With no inflation
trees taxed at realization are cut downat the socially optimal time. As34
inflation increases, the cutting timeoftrees increases; inflation induces
inefficiency. The proof of this fact is tedious and given in the appendix.
However, there is a simple intuitive explanation. Inflation and taxation
interact to make it appear to the investor thatplantingcosts have
increased.The investor chooses u to maximize
[V(u)e(1—T) + TPe —Pe)
=e_r[V(u)(l_T)+TPe—P].
i=1
While in any period he must pay planting Costs of P, when he pays taxes
he can only exclude Pe from his tax base. Effective planting costs
have increased. The natural response is to use less planting by increasing
the time between plantings.35
III. Death and Taxes
Death complicates. Until 1976, in theUnited States, when the holder
of an asset died, the estatepaid no capital gains tax; if the investor's
heirs sold the asset in the future thebasis value of the asset used to
compute capital gains tax liability was its valueon the date of the
investor's death. From the point of viewof the estate, death was equi-
valent to a sale on the date of death
which escaped capital gains taxation.
Althoughdeath may nothavehad much elseto recommend it, it was a dandy
way to avoid taxes. This system ws changed in 1976, and theU.S. began
to wove toward a system like that analyzed inPart I in which the heir's
basis would be the basis of theoriginal purchaser of the asset.. In 1980,
this movement stopped; and the U.S. hasreverted to the pre—1976 system.
In this part of the paper we analyze theeffect of the capital gains
tax on the selling time and valueof Austrian assets when death altersthe way
in which capital gains are taxed.Special treatment of capital gains at
death alters, and in some casesreverses, our conclusions about the effect
of the capital gains taxes onselling time.
Let F(t) be the probability thatthe owner of wine lives until at
leastperiod t.ThenF(0) =1,F(°) =0andF(t)isdecreasing. For
Simplicity we assume F(t) is differentiable and let f(t) =F'(t).If the
probabilityof death is constant then F(t) =eand f(t)=—ye'.Let
bethe rate of capital gains taxation at death.We consider two values
of Td,Td
Qcorresponds to the present U.S. system which is known
asatonatjc step up in basisor stepup forshort. Under step up, capital
gainsta::es are avoided at death.36
Another possible treatment of capital gains at death is what is known
asconstructive realization. Under this system the estate is presumed to
sell the asset at death and to pay tax at the ordinary capital gains rate
on the gains which the sale realizes. Under constructive realization
=T.We compare these two systems to the system analyzed in the last
part which is referred to as a carryover system.
If an investor plans to sell an asset at t, the expected present dis-
counted value of the after taxproceedsis
(27) J(t) =e_rtF(t)(X(t)(l_T)+TB) —fe_rs(X(s)(l_Td)+ TdB))f(s)ds.
The first term in (27) represents the discounted after tax value he will
receive if he lives until t. The second term is the discounted after tax
value which his estate will receive. This formula is not quite correct for
two reasons. First, the pretax value the estate realizes will in general
be more than X(t) since the value of the asset will exceed X(t). Determining
exactly what this value is seems very difficult. Secondly, in contrast to
the analysis of Section I above, B here is an arbitrary parameter. Although
in principle B should satisfy a zero profit condition, it is hard to write
down this condition for this model because investors'mortality functions will
influence their profits. It is hard to figure out what should be the
"market" mortality function. We think neither of these simplifications will
affect our analysis.
The planned selling time t is chosen to maximize J(t); t satisfies
(28) X'(t*)=r[1




For capital gains taxationatthe samerate,planned selling timeis
the same under constructive realization as under carryover. Planned cutting
time is greater under step up.
Proof:
Since f(t)( 0, thisfollows immediately from (28).
Notethat planned selling time is not the sameas actual selling
times. Under either step up or constructive realizationan investor's heirs
may planto sell an asset at a different time than theoriginal investor
planned. This isbecause the heirs will have a different,higher basis
whichwill cause them to plan to sell sooner than theoriginal investor.
They also will have a different mortality function whichwill, under step
upalso affect their planned selling time. It iseasy to see from (27) that
increases in either T orTd will decrease the value of an asset.
The effects of increases in T on planned selling timeare more compli-
cated. Since planned selling time is the same under constructivereali—
zatio.n as under carryover, dt*/dT < 0 in both cases. Understep up dt*/dT
can be either positive or negative. If B =0,the selling time will be
greater under step up then if there were no taxation somust be positive.
f(t*) On the other hand if B is positive and —j:t*)is very snail,will be
f(t*) negative --asIt is when =0.For simplicity we have given the
analysis only for the case of wine, a similar analysis for trees showsthat
u satisfies
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Appendix I —FrequentlyUsed Notation
y(s) Rate of flow of returns from investmei-its in the ordinary sector
s years after the initial investment.
X(t)Value of wine ifconsumedt yearsafter it is laid down.
B Base or initial value of investment in wine.
V(u)Value of a tree if cut down u years after planting.
P Planting cost of a tree.
L Value of land used to grow a sequence of trees.
t Sellingtime which maximizes present discounted value of total
returns to investments in wine.
u Cuttingtime which maximizes present discounted value of total
returns to investment in trees.
Selling time which maximizes private after tax returns to invest—
ments in wine taxed on a realization basis.
Cutting time which maximizes present discounted value of after
tax returns to investments in trees taxed on a realization basis.
t Privately optimal selling time for wine taxed on anaccrualbasis.
Privately optimal selling time for trees taxed on an accrual basis.
r After tax rate of return.
6 Ratio of planting costs to total costs of investments in trees.
T0Rate of taxation in ordinary sector.
T Rate oftaxationin Austrian sectors.
Rate of taxation of capital gains at death40
APPENDIXII
A. Let A(t) =(l—t)exp where t is the solution to
X'(t
X (= r/(1—T).
1.Consider X(t)pt. Then t =(1—T)/r,A(T) =(l_T)eT;A(O) 1,
A'(T) =— ie< 0 and A(1) =0.
0
2. Let X(t) = ford >
i(t—d)c>d 4r
Thent =d+ (1—T)/r and
A(T) =(1—T)exp [T(1 + (rd/(1—T))fl.
A(O) =1;A'(t) = T]exp[T(l+ (rd/(l-T)))] > 0, and
urnA(T)=
t+1
(This example may appear to violate the requirement that X'(t)JX(t) be
decreasing as X'(t)/X(t) is undefined for t< d; however, since
1 X (t)/X(t) =—j
,itis decreasing for t > d. Moreover,
X'(t)/X(t) has but a single local maximum.)41
B.
1.Let C(ri)exp [(r+fl)t T/(1—T)J where c satisfies
X'(ta)IX(ta) =(r+Trl)/(1_T).
Let X(t) =jit.Then we know from example 1 of Appendix II.Athat
C(O) < (1—T)1 for T > 0 so that if C'(O)> 0 the distortions induced
by the capital gains tax are reduced by smallincrements in the race
of inflation. For thiscase, t =(l—T)/(r+Tfl);C(n) exp [T(r+n)J(r+Tfl)J,
and C'(fl) =C(fl)r(l—T)t/(r+Tfl)2so inflation at low races reduces
distortions. However, liin C() =eand ife > (1—T)' (or if T < .632),
n-3w
thenhigh rates of inflation more than correct thedistortions induced by
the capital gains tax. Increases ininflation beyond the point where
C(n) =(1_T)1increase distortions.
2. For a more dramaticexample of this effect, consider again the
case where
t<d
1 X(t) = ford >





It is easy to calculate that C'() > 0.We showed in example 2 of
Appendix II.A that C(0) > (1—T) so increasinginflation exacerbates
the distortions of the capital gainstax.42
3. For an example where C'()can be negative let X(t) =ut+ k




1—T)r k It is easy to show that for 0 <I < 1sign [C'()] =sign
[r+Tfl)2
—
p(l—i)] Fork > C'(n)<0.43
C.position A.l. The optimal cutting time of trees taxed on an accrual
basis is decreasing in T), the rate of inflation.





Assumingan interior solution, the first—order conditions imply
-____
l—T,U
(A.l) P <V(ua) e
r+TT1 r+Tfl




r+Tfl)u -ru -ru 2
—
[V(ua)el—T -PIrea} (l—ea) =
du- a
Thus, = and,since L < 0 from the second—order conditions,
a a
du —ru V'(u )u a a a a sign =sign =signV(ua) { (e —1)[V(ua)+ 1]
-ru -ru + [r(l—rea) + TIT(l —ea)])
Rearranging the first—order condition (A.2), we find that
V' (Ua)ua _rua ua
—ru
V(ua) + 1) (e —1)+ —[r(l—Te ) + ryr(1 —e LI
r+ Tfl
—ua rurF)ua Ua —
V()
Pre e +e —1.
Thus,
du u -ru (r+tfl) —ru a
ra al-T a a s1gn----=sign Pre e +e—1).
V (Ua)4L+
,r+Tfl — 1T)ua
From (A.1) we know that P <V(Ua)e ,.whichiinplies
Ua rua (r±Tfl)urua
(A.3) Pre e -e -1 <(ur+1)ea1
V(Ua)
a
The right-hand side of (A.3) attains a maximum over uar >0when
-ru dua
uar =0.At this point (uar +1)e
a-1=0.Thus, <0. dii —L5
D.
Inthis section, we show that with wine taxed on a realization basis,
at low rates of inflation an increase in ri can increase or decrease selling








1 TB Then from (21), with n =0,t' =— +d-— — andfrom (22) and (23) r 1—Tn
rT B -1-dr+






Inserting the condition B =W*(T,0)from (22), we see that the right-hand
dt*J >0 side of the above equation equals sign[rd. Since rd >0, =o
2. Let x(t) =pt+cwhere c >0.Setting =0,(21) implies
1c TB that t =— — — — — — , andfrom (22) and (23),
r 1-'1—TP
-i+E
p(l—T)e ' (l—T).i W*(T,0) =r
Inserting this value of t into (24) and settingn =0,we find





SettingB =W*(T,0),the right-hand side of this equation becomes
dt* I sign [_2-J•Thus,if Cequals Zero =0,while if c is greater
than zerodt*J<0. dn=046
E. Proposition A.2. For trees taxed at realization,the optimal cutting
time, u, is increasing in r.
Proof: An investor with a plot of land which can support onetree forever
chooses to cut each tree planted after u years, whereu solves
-rut -flu




Assuming an interior solution, a first—ordercondition for this problem is
ru* _flu* ru*
={[(1_T)V(u*)—(re +rre )P][e —1]
ru* ru* flu* ru* 2
—re [(l_T)V(u*) —(e —Te )P)} + (e —1)=0.
du*
Thus =
----and,since —<0from the second—order conditions, —
3u*
sign =sign
----sign{[ (r+fl)u*—l}e+(1_flu*)}•
fl
Rearranging,we find that
[(r+fl)u*_l)e +(l_flu*)=flu*(e —1)+(ru*—l)eru+1>
ru*
>flu*(e —1) >0.
du* Thus —>0.